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Abstract
Some consequences of uncertainties in radiobiological risk due to galactic
cosmic ray (GCR) exposure are analyzed for their eect on engineering designs
for the rst lunar outpost and a mission to explore Mars. This report presents
the plausible eect of biological uncertainties , the design changes necessary
to reduce the uncertainties to acceptable levels for a safe mission, and an
evaluation of the mission redesign cost. Estimates of the amount of shield mass
required to compensate for radiobiological uncertainty are given for a simplied
vehicle and habitat. The additional amount of shield mass required to provide
a safety factor for uncertainty compensation is calculated from the expected
response to GCR exposure. The amount of shield mass greatly increases in the
estimated range of biological uncertainty, thus escalating the estimated cost of
the mission. The estimates are used as a quantitative example for the cost -
eectiveness of research in radiation biophysics and radiation physics.
Introduction
Human exposure to radiation during space ex-
ploration is an unavoidable occupational hazard.
However, if the probability that crew members will
experience deleterious eects can be adequately re-
duced, this risk may be judged acceptable when mis-
sion objectives and other mission risks are consid-
ered. The risks are characterized as either stochastic
or deterministic. The main stochastic eect is cancer
induction. The three main deterministic eects are
prodromal response, temporary sterility, and lens
opacity. The current criteria for dening acceptable
risk in the United States are those recommended by
the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurements (NCRP). The criteria are based on the
analysis of annual fatality rates from occupationally
related accidents and the need to control early radi-
ation eects, which may adversely impact the ability
of the astronaut to perform required tasks safely. On
this basis, risk of stochastic eects has been dened
in terms of the increase in lifetime probability, above
the natural incidence, that the radiation exposure
will result in fatal cancer. According to this crite-
rion, an acceptable risk level limits the excess fatal
cancer probability to 3 percent or less (ref. 1). Such
a risk was considered acceptable for routine space
operations in low Earth orbit (LEO). Similarly, dose
limits are given in reference 1 that limit deterministic
eects to ensure mission safety and astronaut health.
In LEO, the predominant exposure is from elec-
trons and protons. For this radiation, extrapolations
based on existing radiobiological data may be ad-
equate, and quantities commonly used in radiation
protection, such as the dose D, the dose equivalent
H , and quality factor Q, relating D to H as follows:
H = QD (1)
have been used to establish radiation limits (see ta-
ble I). In equation (1), the quality factor is a function
of the linear energy transfer (LET) of the radiation.
The exact functional form of the quality factor is pre-
scribed in the process of setting radiation guidelines,
making Q a legislated quantity rather than the result
of a measurement. However, the dependence of Q on
LET, Q(L), is intended to reect a judgment related
to the dependence of relative biological eectiveness
(RBE) on LET at the anticipated levels of exposure.
For a radiation eld with a distribution of LET val-
ues, the use of an average quality factor is required
(ref. 1). The average quality factor is determined as
follows:
Q =
1
D
Z
Q(L)
dD
dL
dL (2)
where dD=dL is the dose contribution per unit LET
interval.
Table I. Exposure Limits for LEO Operations
Exposure limits, Sv, for|
Exposure
time Blood-forming organs Eye Skin
30 days 0.25 1 1.5
Annual 0.5 2 3
Career a[2 + 0:075 (Age  To)] 4 6
aAverage career dose-equivalent limit for both male (To =
30) and female (To = 38) astronauts for a 3-percent increase
of cancer risk (ref. 1).
For galactic cosmic rays (GCR) and, in partic-
ular, for the highly charged energetic (HZE) nuclei
that constitute the biologically most signicant com-
ponent of GCR, these equations may no longer pro-
vide an adequate description of the radiation risk
(ref. 1). Evidence that the description of the risk is
inadequate has been provided by the measurement of
sister chromatid exchanges in resting human lympho-
cytes irradiated with 238Pu -particles (ref. 2), by the
observation of abnormalities in stem cell colonies sur-
viving similar -particle irradiation (ref. 3), and by
the partial disintegration of chromosomes after irra-
diation with high-energy heavy ion beams to simulate
space radiation (ref. 4). In these examples, a quality
factor related to RBE becomes meaningless because
at doses comparable to that delivered by one particle
(or a few particles) and for radiation eects that are
not manifest for low-LET radiation (e.g., X rays),
the RBE becomes innite. Thus, new methods to
predict the risk resulting from exposure to GCR ra-
diation must be developed.
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Figure 1. NASA Space Radiation Program estimates for cur-
rent and projected risk uncertainties.
In addition to the problems posed by radiation
eects not observable at reference doses of low-LET
radiation, estimates of risk are uncertain, even for
known radiation eects. In the United States, the
NASA Space Radiation Health Program has been
established to sponsor research intended to further
\the scientic basis for the radiation protection of
humans engaged in the exploration of space" (ref. 5).
A main objective of the program is to reduce the
uncertainty in the prediction of radiation risk so that
it is within a factor of 2 (50- to 200-percent range)
by 1997 and within a factor of 1.25 (25 percent) by
2010 as shown in gure 1. The present uncertainty
in risk predictions is estimated to be as large as an
order of magnitude (10- to 1000-percent range). This
is no more than an educated guess, obtained with
the assumption that the uncertainty of a factor of
10 is the uncertainty in the prediction of shielding
eectiveness (a factor of 2 to 3) and the uncertainty
in predicting biological response to HZE particles (a
factor of 4 to 5).
Engineers and mission planners must compensate
for these uncertainties to ensure that risk limits are
not exceeded. Depending on policies and engineering
judgment, the compensation required may be one,
two, or more standard deviations (with a Gaussian
distribution assumed for the uncertainties). For ex-
ample, if predictions of risk are considered accurate
only within an order of magnitude (factor of 10), the
shielding of a spacecraft required to remain below a
3-percent excess cancer risk may in reality be de-
signed for a 30-percent excess cancer risk; this risk is
clearly not acceptable. The shield mass would have
to be greatly increased to ensure that the excess can-
cer risks did not exceed 3 percent in view of such
large uncertainties.
The compensation required for uncertainty can
signicantly increase costs. If the shielding thick-
ness of a lunar or martian habitat has to be
increased by a factor of two, the total shield volume
(mass) increases by more than a factor of two. As
the volume increases, the time necessary to assem-
ble the habitat increases for a constant work force;
increasing the work force requires transporting more
mass to orbit per launch or increasing the number
of launches. The increased assembly time would in-
crease extravehicular activity (EVA), and the Shuttle
cannot presently support extensive EVA. Time is also
quantized; the duration of one mission is expected to
be 30 to 60 days. If the habitat assembly extends
beyond the duration of one mission, the number of
launches doubles. If habitat assembly extends be-
yond two missions, the number of launches triples.
Faster assembly of the habitat requires more ma-
chinery; the cost of machinery development, testing,
and deployment must then be added to the cost of
launching the machinery mass. These relationships
are depicted in gure 2.
Another example of the complex eect of in-
creases in shielding to account for uncertainties in
risk prediction may be seen in gure 3, a schematic
view of a typical solar energetic particle (SEP) event.
The X rays arrive at the lunar surface within 9 min
of the start of the event and can be used as a warn-
ing signal to crews. Signicant particle uxes begin
to be experienced t1 minutes (or hours) later and
would rapidly increase until, at a time t2 after the
initial warning, the radiation levels inside a shielded
rover vehicle on the lunar surface would exceed
2
allowed limits. Before this time, the crew must nd
a storm shelter or return to the safety of the shielded
base.
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Figure 2. Logic diagram showing eects of increased shielding
on launch requirements.
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Figure 3. Limits on exploration range due to possible SEP
events. Area = v2(t)2; v depends on shielding and
determines fuel requirements; t depends on shielding
and forecasting ability.
The maximum distance that a lunar rover vehicle
can be allowed to travel away from a safe location is
given by vt, where v is the velocity of the rover.
This distance gives the maximum area that can be
explored in one sortie, Amax = v
2(t)2. Thus, at
constant velocity, the sortie range is determined by
the warning time and by the rover speed. Higher
rover speed may require more fuel, more batteries,
or larger engines and may also result in less vehicle
reliability. Hence, more spare parts or more backup
vehicles may be required. All these requirements ne-
cessitate mass lifted from Earth. Increasing rover
shielding to extend sortie time may reduce the speed
of the rover and result in similar increased mass re-
quirements. Establishing shielded refuges to increase
the surface range requires an increase in construction
time and may lead to supply mission restrictions that
are quantized (more launches). Another alternative
is to delay surface exploration until a permanently
inhabited base is established.
Current estimates of GCR radiation exposure
(ref. 6) clearly show that the radiation risk limits
the design and operation of lunar and martian mis-
sions. The risk uncertainties discussed previously will
have a large impact on mission design. Trade-os be-
tween uncertain biological risk, design costs, and the
investment in research required to reduce these un-
certainties heavily favor the research investment. As
benecial as research is for missions of long duration,
what are the eects of uncertainties in biological re-
sponse and shielding properties on missions of shorter
duration? This question will be considered in the fol-
lowing sections.
There is interest within NASA to plan a return
to the Moon for a mission with a duration of 45 to
60 days to establish the rst lunar outpost (FLO).1
Unlike a mission to Mars or a permanent lunar base,
where exposure to HZE particles plays a dominant
role, the total GCR dose for a 60-day mission is
70 mSv or less (ref. 6). The current main shield was
designed for protection from a possible SEP event
and not primarily for protection from HZE exposure.
In the following sections, a simple shielding cong-
uration is assumed and its modication to account
for the uncertainties in risk prediction is calculated
to illustrate the preceding considerations. The low
incidence of GCR exposure allows for linear approxi-
mations using risk coecients. The model is used to
estimate the eects of biological risk uncertainty on
shield mass and projected mission costs. Following
the 60-day lunar mission, the analysis is applied to
1NASA Exploration Program Oce Report: FLO Mission
Overview, May 1992.
3
Ri
sk
, p
er
ce
nt
100
80
60
40
20
2 σ
1 σ
Nominal
0
.5 1 1.5 2 .5 1 1.5 2
Dose, GyDose, Gy
Ri
sk
, p
er
ce
nt
100
80
60
40
20
0
2 σ
1 σ
Nominal
(a) Anorexia, 2 days. (b) Nausea, 2 days.
100
80
60
40
20
0
.5 1 1.5 2
Dose, Gy
.5 1 1.5 2
Dose, Gy
Ri
sk
, p
er
ce
nt
Ri
sk
, p
er
ce
nt
100
80
60
40
20
0
2 σ
1 σ
Nominal
2 σ
1 σ
Nominal
(c) Fatigue, 6 weeks. (d) Vomiting, 2 days.
.5 1 1.5 2 .5 1 1.5 2
Dose, Gy Dose, Gy
100
80
60
40
20
0
Ri
sk
, p
er
ce
nt
100
80
60
40
20
0
Ri
sk
, p
er
ce
nt
2 σ
1 σ
Nominal
2 σ
1 σ
Nominal
(e) Diarrhea, 6 weeks. (f) Death, 60 days.
Figure 4. Risk of prodromal response within specied postexposure time period because of X ray exposure.
a 6-month lunar mission and two missions to explore
Mars.
While the methodology is quite general and can
be applied to other space exploration missions, it is
essential to incorporate the eects of uncertainty in
radiation risk estimates into engineering designs at
the earliest possible stage, so that a realistic assess-
ment of the impact of radiation protection limits on
mission costs and launch mass can be established.
The purpose of the present report is to explore the
plausible eect of the radiobiological risk uncertain-
ties, the change in mission design to reduce the risks
to acceptable levels, and an evaluation of the redesign
cost to perform a safe mission. The approach de-
scribed herein is also intended to oer some insight
into the problems of extrapolating data from the cur-
rent LEO radiation limits and applying this data to
lunar and martian missions.
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Radiation Risk Data Base
Deterministic radiation eects are identied by
relating the severity of injury to the degree of ex-
posure. Even though a given level of exposure will
result in dierent levels of injury among a group of
individuals, the severity of injury for a given indi-
vidual increases with increased exposure level. De-
terministic eects are associated with the sensitive
parenchyma cell populations, their associated less
mature populations, and their support systems. The
injury in most tissues results mainly from the in-
ability of the cells to undergo division (clonogenic
death), which is the functional purpose of the stem
populations (ref. 7). The primary tissues involved are
bone marrow, skin, ocular lens, and intestinal lining.
Early response risk functions derived by the Space
Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences
for low-LET radiation (ref. 8) are shown in gure 4.
These data were mainly derived from radiation ther-
apy patients with high naturally occurring rates of
symptoms. As a consequence, the radiation-induced
responses had large corrections. Later evaluations of
data presented in reference 1 from victims accidently
exposed to radiation were used to correct the vom-
iting response curves. The 1 bounds are used here
for risk evaluations.
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Figure 5. Dose protraction eects on median response to skin
exposures for low-LET radiations (ref. 9).
Repair of radiation injury occurs on the cellular
level and on the tissue system level. Rate of repair is
readily revealed at a given exposure level by fraction-
ated exposure schedules. These schedules are deter-
mined by dividing the amount of exposure into equal
levels that are portioned over a time period. The
dose level at which 50 percent of a human popula-
tion shows early skin response to X rays for various
fractionated schedules is shown in gure 5. It is seen
from the gure that 20 percent of the damage is re-
paired over a 3-day fractionated schedule.
Stochastic radiation eects are identied by the
probability of occurrence, not severity, being related
to degree of exposure. Although a given level of
exposure will represent some level of risk for a given
group, the risk within a given subgroup may be
higher or lower at the same exposure level. The
risks of the subgroup are related to factors such
as age, sex, genetic disposition, and environmental
inuences (ref. 9). The occurrence of cancer, a prime
stochastic eect, is associated with changes in the
genetic structure of a cell, for which the normal
controls against cell division have been inactivated.
Obviously, cells that have suered clonogenic death
do not contribute to stochastic eects.
The repair of radiation injury to the genetic ma-
terial of a cell (transformation) occurs at the cellular
level. The promotion of a transformed cell to a cancer
cell occurs when the cell division process starts; this
promotion is tissue dependent (ref. 7). Cell repair
processes could be studied using fractionated expo-
sure schedules, but only a small amount of data on
humans is available for making risk estimates. In the
analysis of data on humans, the relative risk model
is usually favored. For this model the age-specic
cancer risk is written (ref. 9) as
(D) = o

1 + f(D) g()

(3)
where o is the naturally occurring rate; f(D) is
the dose response, usually assumed to be linear-
quadratic in D; and g() depends on age, sex, age
at exposure, and environmental factors. If risk of
subsequent exposures is additive, the quadratic dose
term vanishes as the number of fractions becomes
large. The quadratic term is known from studies
of the nuclear weapons used in World War II. We
assume o and g() for lifetime risk for exposure at
age 35. The excess risk of fatal cancer is then
R(D) = (D)   o
= 0:03D

1 +
D
1:16

(4)
where D is the dose equivalent in sieverts. The non-
linear term is negligible for highly protracted expo-
sures. Equation (4) rests mainly on -ray exposures,
although a small neutron contribution was present,
mainly in the Hiroshima event (ref. 9).
5
High-LET Exposure Risks
The dose used for low-LET radiation to char-
acterize the human response data in the previous
section is best understood by considering how the
dose is deposited in individual cells . The energy ab-
sorbed within a cell is "i, and the total dose within
the tissue cell population is given as
D =
"i
V NE
=
"i
V NH
NH
NE
(5)
where NE is the total number of cells exposed, V is
the cell volume, and NH is the total number of cells
\hit" during exposure. At a low dose, not all cells
are hit, so the number of hit cells NH is less than the
number of cells exposed. Only as NH ! NE does the
value of D have meaning in terms of tissue response
(ref. 10). The fraction of cells hit at low exposure
(NH  NE) is
NH
NE
 g  (6)
where g is the geometric cross section and  is the
particle uence. The cross section can be larger
than the geometric cross section because of the
-ray diusion, but equation (6) is assumed here
to be a rst-order approximation. The particle u-
ence  is related to the absorbed dose and LET as
 = (6:24D)=L (for  in particles/m2, D in Gy,
and L in keV/m). For -rays, L corresponds to
0.2 keV/m, and the corresponding  is an eec-
tive -ray uence that is dependent on the photoab-
sorption coecient and the actual uence. The event
spectra are approximated by a continuous distribu-
tion f(") d", so the dose is written as follows:
D = 6:24g
D
L
"i
V NH
 6:24
gD
V L
Z
"f(")d" (7)
Equation (7) shows that 0:16(V L=g) is the aver-
age event size in keV within the cell. This relation-
ship is related to microdosimetric relations, where
the average lineal energy (energy of event divided by
cell mean chord) is numerically equal to the LET
for the usual triangular event distribution (ref. 11).
The fraction of cells hit and the mean event energy
are shown for a 1-Gy exposure in gure 6. The
fraction of hit cells in the multihit region is ac-
cording to Poisson statistics. The low-LET region
(L < 5 keV/m) involves exposure of a large frac-
tion of the cells, while very few cells are directly ir-
radiated at high-LET (L  5 keV/m) when hit
cells receive large energy deposition (>100 keV). On
this basis, we expect the biological response to a
1-Gy exposure by radiations of greatly dierent LET
to be substantially dissimilar. Yet, the important
factors in predicting tissue response depend on the
probability of cell injury at a given event level, the
eciency of cellular repair, and the role of the cell
in the function of the tissue. As an example, we
have calculated the geometric hit frequency, the ini-
tial level of cell injury, and the unrepaired cell injury
that lead to clonogenic death (ref. 12) in C3H10T1/2
mouse cells. Figure 7 shows that the cell is most
often hit by hydrogen and helium ions, but with
small probability of injury. The gure also shows
that the repair eciency is high, which leaves little
permanent injury. Conversely, the silicon and iron
ions have high probabilities of injury when hits oc-
cur and near zero eciencies of repair. As a conse-
quence, most clonogenic death from GCR exposure
is because of ions with LET above 10 keV/m, such
as ions heavier than carbon, and these exposed cells
show minimal repair. As a result, dose protraction
for GCR exposure is less eective in reducing the
biological response.
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Figure 6. Nonuniformity of exposure at the 1-Gy level for a
typical tissue system. D = 1 Gy; g  100 m
2.
The conventional method of extrapolating the
data base for human exposure to high-LET radiation
is expressed in equation (1). Equation (1) follows
from an analogy with the RBE given for -ray and
ion exposure levels D and Di, which result in the
same biological end point by the equation
RBE =
D
Di
(8)
6
103
104
LET
∞
, keV/µm
Total cell hits
Initial injury
Unrepaired injury
Ce
ll 
ev
en
ts/
LE
T 
in
te
rv
al 102
101
100
10-1
10-2
10-3
10-4
10310210110010-1
H
He
C N
O
Si Fe
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Table II. RBEM for Fission Neutron Exposures
[From ref. 11]
Biological end points RBEM
Tumor induction . . . . . . . . . . 3{200
Life shortening . . . . . . . . . . . 15{45
Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . 35{70
Cytogenic studies . . . . . . . . . . 40{50
Genetic end points in
mammalian systems . . . . . . . . 10{45
Other end points:
Lens opacication . . . . . . . . . 25{200
Micronucleus assay . . . . . . . . 6{60
Testes weight loss . . . . . . . . . 5{20
As noted, the quality factor is a dened quan-
tity (not given by a measurement) and represents
trends of measured RBE in cell culture, plant, and
animal experiments. The RBE values depend on end
point, dose, dose rate, and quality of the radiation,
which is usually represented by LET. It is usually
assumed that the RBE reaches a maximum value
(RBEM) at a suciently low dose relative to the ini-
tial slopes of the response curves of each radiation
type (ref. 1). Furthermore, the dose at which RBEM
is achieved is assumed to be dose-rate dependent as
shown schematically in gure 8. The values of RBE
from which Q is dened as a function of LET are
largely for high dose rates at the 0.1-Gy level of ex-
posure. At this level, ssion neutrons with Q = 25
correspond to a -ray exposure of 2.5 Gy (i.e., RBE=
25 for these exposures). The RBEM values for lower
levels of exposure and/or lower dose rates are much
larger (ref. 11) as shown in table II and occur for
lower exposure and dose rates than were used in de-
riving Q. Since RBEM is achieved faster at low dose
rates, the RBE values in table II may in fact be more
appropriate for space exposures. This is one source
of the uncertainties in space radiation exposures.
A second source of the uncertainties concerns
the response to HZE exposures, for which little is
known. It is postulated that there are possible
single-ion track eects for which -ray exposures have
no analog. One such mechanism was suggested by
Todd (ref. 13) in which cells exposed at 0.25 Gy
outside the track core have a high probability of
being transformed, while the dead cells in the track
core must be replaced, causing promotion to a cancer
growth by this single exposure event (g. 9). The
RBE's for such eects are undened (innite), and
extrapolation from the present human data base is
not possible.
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Figure 9. Single-particle eect proposed by Todd in
reference 13.
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The use of an LET-dependent quality factor as re-
lated to dose equivalent implies additivity of diverse
components to estimate risk. Such assumptions may
underestimate the actual risk, as was discussed by
Scott (ref. 14). Furthermore, risks associated with
dierent time intervals are not additive. For low-LET
exposures, substantial repair often occurs and results
in reduced risk. For high-LET exposures, there are
possible dose-rate enhancement eects (ref. 15) in
which risk is substantially increased at lower dose
rates. (See g. 10.)
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Figure 10. Dose protraction eects in mice with repair for
low LET (-ray) and enhancementat high LET for ssion
neutron (ref. 15).
The uncertainties in radiation risk levels have
been estimated in the Radiation Health Program
(ref. 5) and are presented in gure 1. In the approx-
imation used herein, it is assumed that the risk is
related to the total value of dose equivalent and that
the dose response curve is of similar shape for each
radiation component. At low dose and dose rate, the
response is linear. The excess risk is then
R = kH = k(Hx +Hz) (9)
where H is dose equivalent (in Sv), Hx is the com-
ponent of dose equivalent from low-LET radiation,
and Hz is the dose equivalent that results from the
HZE component of the radiation. We make the fur-
ther approximation that the uncertainties in k and
Hx are negligible compared with the uncertainty in
Hz and obtain
R = k
Hz
Hz
Hz  kUHz (10)
so that the net eect of the uncertainty in R is to
increase the relative risk, which becomes
R +R = kH + kUHz = kHu (11)
This equation denes an eective dose equivalent Hu
that corresponds to the increased risk from uncer-
tainties. If a limit L is dened on the basis of excess
risk R, it is required that
R+R  L (12)
A safety factor S can be dened with reference
to equation (11). Let S be an upper bound on
the estimated value of the uncertainty in the HZE
dose equivalent and S = nU , where n = 1; 2; : : :
corresponds to the number of standard deviations
required to establish an acceptable safety margin.
Then equation (11) becomes
R+R = kH + kSHz = kHs (13)
where the eective dose equivalent, including the
safety factor, is given by Hs = H + SHz ; alterna-
tively, the HZE component in equation (9) can be
increased according to H 0
z
= Hz+SHz = (1+S)Hz.
This equation suggests the possibility of using the ra-
tio between experimental values of RBE (as appro-
priate for GCR exposure) and Q as an approxima-
tion for 1 + S; for example, the measured RBE for
life shortening in mice has been reported as large as
80 for ssion neutrons (ref. 15), while the estimated
value of Q is on the order of 20. Thus, an estimate
for the value of S would be 3, which corresponds
to an eective dose equivalent 300 percent greater
for HZE exposure than would be obtained from cur-
rently accepted dosimetric analyses. Such a value
(300 percent) might be considered reasonable from a
radiobiological point of view and may not be too re-
strictive on mission design and operations. Normally
high RBE values are associated with stochastic ef-
fects, and it is clear from gure 7 that cell killing has
large RBE's for HZE exposure. Since cell killing is
the assumed cause of early response, high RBE's are
indicated.
Eects of Uncertainty on Shield Design
An astronaut on a lunar or martian mission is
exposed to low-level GCR and is subject to the pos-
sibility of a large SEP event. We consider only the
exposure of the blood forming organs (BFO), which
is closely related to whole-body exposure and overall
life shortening due to neoplastic disease. The solar
minimum environment (maximum exposure) as pre-
scribed by the cosmic ray eects on microelectronics
8
(CREME) model of the Naval Research Laboratory
(ref. 16) is assumed, since the mission time is not
yet specied. The CREME model underestimates
the actual environment by at least 25 percent. The
observed SEP's are variable in spectral characteris -
tics and intensities, so that for design considerations,
we assume an SEP model that consists of the spec-
trum envelope that bounds the (estimated) observed
uence at any observed energy. This spectrum is
similar to the Viking mission design criteria2 except
that the envelope is now given by the February 1956,
November 1960, and August 1972 events, as shown in
gure 11. The dierential uence spectral envelope
'(E) is determined by expressions derived from the
individual are spectral characteristics (ref. 17) and
is given analytically as
'(E) = max(f1; f2; f3) (14)
where
f1  6:0  10
7 exp[ (E   10)=25] + 9:4E
+ 05 exp[ (E   100)=320]
f2  6:3 10
8 exp[ (E   10)=12] + 4:9E
+ 06 exp[ (E   100)=80]
f3  3:0 10
8 exp[ (E   30)=26:5]
In the above equation, E is energy in MeV and '
is in protons/cm2-MeV. The f1; f2; and f3 symbols
represent uences for the 1956, 1960, and 1972 ares,
respectively. Of these three events, the 1972 event
spectrum is best known through deep space measure-
ments, the 1960 event spectrum is less well-known
while the 1956 event spectrum is only crudely known
to about a factor of two.
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Figure 11. An estimate for the maximum uence spectrum
for an SEP event.
2NASA Viking Project Oce Report: Viking Project 75; April
1972, (M75-125-2).
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Figure 12. Models used for transfer vehicle and habitat
congurations.
The total BFO dose equivalent as a function of
shield thickness for a water-equivalent shield has
been calculated using the nucleon transport code
BRYNTRN (ref. 18) for the are spectrum, and the
nucleon/heavy-ion transport code HZETRN (ref. 19)
for the GCR contribution. The body geometry is the
computerized anatomical man model (CAM) from
reference 20. The assumed quality factor is speci-
ed by ICRP-26 (ref. 21). For simplicity, shield con-
gurations are taken as spherical shells of constant
thickness, and dose evaluations are made at the cen-
ter of the sphere, as shown in gure 12. For the living
space, a minimum interior volume corresponding to
reasonable astronaut performance (10.5 m3/person,
ref. 22) for a four-member crew is assumed. The
storm shelter is assumed to be one-third as large
as the living space. The variation of dose equiva-
lent with shell thickness is evaluated for two cong-
urations: a complete spherical shell representing a
lunar transfer vehicle (LTV) in cis-lunar space or a
martian transfer vehicle (MTV), and a hemispherical
shell representing a habitat on the lunar or martian
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Figure 13. Risk of early responses occurring to astronauts exposed to SEP in vehicles or habitats for a 60-day lunar mission
nominal design.
surface. We estimate the risk by accumulating the
30-day GCR exposure within the living quarters with
negligible repair and no dose-rate enhancements as
the background levels at the start of an SEP event.
A nominal shelter design is determined by limiting
the background exposure plus solar-event exposure
to less than 0.25 Sv for any 30-day period (ref. 1).
The nominal wall thickness is determined by limit-
ing the excess fatal cancer risk to 3 percent. The
nominal wall thickness must be at least that of the
pressure vessel and meteoroid bumper (assumed to
be 2 g/cm2 of aluminum). These assumptions are
perhaps pessimistic but consistent with our current
stated knowledge of uncertainty.
Table III. Nominal Shield for Lunar andMartianMissions
Shielding, g/cm2 Al, for|
Lunarmissions Martianmissions
Shield location 60 days 6 months 18 months 29 months
Vehiclewall 2 2 5.9 3.8
Vehicleshelter 46 46 36.4 41.1
Habitatwall 2 2 17 17
Habitatshelter 7 7 0 0
A 60-Day Lunar Mission
The dose equivalents have also been computed
for a mission duration of 60 days, 45 days on the
lunar surface and 5 days transit time each way,
with 5 days total spent in low Earth orbit. The
transmitted doses of the LTV and habitat shields
dier by a factor of two as a result of shielding of
the habitat by the Moon. The BFO dose equivalents
have been evaluated according to the human body
geometry specied by the computerized anatomical
man (ref. 20). We assume that the BFO exposure is
indicative of the whole-body exposure. The nominal
shield amounts are given in table III.
10
8
4
2
0 300 600 900
HZE risk uncertainty, percent
Vehicle
Habitat
6
R
isk
, p
er
ce
nt
Currently
accepted
risk
Figure 14. Excess fatal cancer risk for astronauts exposed to
SEP in vehicles and habitats for a 60-day lunar mission
nominal design.
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Figure 15. Required shield for walls and shelters to protect astronauts from SEP for 60-day lunar mission.
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Figure 16. Excess mission cost from added shielding for vehi-
cle and habitat to ensure astronaut safety for 60-day lunar
mission.
The risk of early response for the nominal design
is calculated by using equation (11) and the 1 early
response functions in gure 4. In the estimates, we
assumed that the SEP event occurred while in transit
(vehicle) or while on station (habitat). The risks of
nausea and vomiting are shown in gure 13. The
nominal design for no uncertainty shows zero risk as
expected, but nite risks are obtained at the higher
levels of uncertainty (risks may be aected by other
stress factors, which tend to elicit these responses
during the mission). The excess fatal cancer risk
is shown in gure 14. The required shield amount
for the walls and shelters is shown in gure 15,
and the cost above the nominal design is shown in
gure 16. The excess cost was estimated on the
basis of the cost of the Apollo mission to deliver
the lander and associated equipment to the lunar
surface. We use the $93 billion (1990) estimated by
the Augustine Commission (ref. 23) for the Apollo
program to deliver 800000 lb (ref. 24) to the lunar
surface. This amount corresponds to the $116 250/lb
or $255 million/metric ton. It is clear from gure 16
that the excess cost at the 300-percent uncertainty
level is about $7 billion dollars over the nominal
mission design.
A 6-Month Lunar Mission
The nominal shield design for a 6-month mission
is shown in table III; this design is the same as for
the 60-day mission, since the risks of early eects as a
function of uncertainty are determined by the 30-day
exposures and are the same as for the 60-day mission
(g. 17). The excess fatal cancer risk (g. 18) is
within 3 percent for uncertainties below 700 percent.
An increased wall thickness is required for the habitat
above the 700-percent level. The required thicknesses
for the walls and shelters are shown in gure 19,
and the excess mission cost is shown in gure 20.
The eects of the increased habitat wall thickness
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Figure 17. Risk of early response occurring to astronauts exposed to SEP in vehicles or habitats for 6-month lunar mission
nominal design.
required to limit the fatal cancer risk are seen above
700 percent. (The excess shield cost is estimated for
the 6-month mission and is similar to the excess cost
of the 60-day mission.)
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Figure 18. Excess fatal cancer risk for astronauts exposed to
SEP in vehicles or habitats for 6-month lunar mission
nominal design.
An 18-Month Martian Mission
The nominal shield design for the 18-month mis-
sion to Mars is shown in table III. The wall thick-
ness of the vehicle is designed to limit the excess
fatal cancer risk for the mission to 3 percent. The
habitat wall thickness is the minimum required for a
pressure vessel (2 g/cm2) plus the atmosphere over-
head (15 g/cm2); the wall is unaected by the fatal
cancer risk, since only 30 days are assumed for the
on-station exposure. Moreover, because of the natu-
ral protection by the atmosphere, the need for sepa-
rate shelter in the habitat for protection from solar
ares is precluded. The increased risk of early re-
sponse due to uncertainties is dierent from the risk
for the lunar missions, as shown in gure 21. This
dierence is a result of the increased shielding of the
martian atmosphere and of the living quarters in the
nominal mission design. The excess fatal cancer risk
could be unacceptable, approaching 15 percent at the
900-percent uncertainty level (g. 22). The required
shelter shield amount is controlled mainly by the re-
quired increase in wall thickness as a function of un-
certainty (g. 23). Hence, the required shelter shield
decreases as the vehicle wall increases. The excess
mission costs shown in gure 24 are calculated under
the assumption that a mission to Mars is four times
as expensive as the lunar mission (ref. 23).
A 29-Month Martian Mission
This mission has substantially dierent circum-
stances than the previously described short-stay mar-
tian mission; transit times have been reduced and
stay time has increased greatly. Both outbound and
inbound voyages will be 5 months, with time spent
on the planet surface set at 19 months (refs. 25
and 26). Table III gives the nominal shield design
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Figure 19. Required shield for walls and shelters to protect astronauts from SEP for 6-month lunar mission.
thicknesses, and the requirements are again to limit
excess fatal cancer risk to 3 percent. As for the
18-month mission to Mars, the habitat protection at
the planet is prescribed as the nominal pressure ves-
sel thickness (2 g/cm2) plus the overhead atmosphere
amount (15 g/cm2). The increase of fatal cancer risk
with HZE uncertainty (g. 25) is greater because of
the longer total mission duration, but only slightly
so; excess risk is again on the order of 15 percent
at 900-percent uncertainty. The early response ef-
fects (nausea, vomiting) have been assessed for this
mission; as expected, they are almost identical with
those for the 18-month mission (g. 21).
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Figure 20. Excess mission cost from added shielding for ve-
hicle and habitat to ensure astronaut safety for 6-month
lunar mission.
Figure 26 shows the required shield amounts for
the 29-month mission; where as for the 18-month
mission, the required vehicle shield for shelter from
an SEP event in transit decreases as the vehicle wall
thickness grows. Because of the shorter travel times,
the wall thickness growth with HZE uncertainty is
less noticeable than for the 18-month mission. As a
consequence, the corresponding rise of estimated cost
is also less (g. 27).
Discussion of Results
The present study relates the current estimates
of biological uncertainty (ref. 5) to the practical
problems of engineering design and mission cost. An
earlier attempt to present the eects of biological
uncertainties based on the use of dose limits as action
levels (ref. 27) did not give a clear presentation of
the potential for added risk for the uncertainty level
assumed. The present report in which potential risk
increase is presented explicitly provides operational
guidance with respect to redesign considerations.
For example, a 15-percent risk of nausea within a
2-day period following a solar are is not necessarily
unacceptable and may be preferred to a substantial
increase in mission cost. Conversely, a 15-percent
excess risk of fatal cancer may not be justiable and
will require costly redesign. The advantage of risk-
based models is aptly demonstrated.
Still in developing a risk-based approach to space
radiation protection, there are many issues to be
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Figure 21. Risk of early responses occurring to astronauts exposed to SEP in vehicles or habitats for 18-month mission to Mars
nominal design.
resolved. The primary issue is that for human radi-
ation response, data are known mainly for the high
dose-rate -ray exposures from nuclear weapons used
in World War II. The practical use of these data for
fractionated or low dose rate exposures over many
years cannot be solved without some assessment of
radiation injury repair rates and repair eciencies,
which vary greatly among the various cell popula-
tions within the human body.
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Figure 22. Excess fatal cancer risk for astronauts exposed to
SEP in vehicles and habitats for 18-monthmissionto Mars
nominal design.
A second but not unrelated issue is the extrapola-
tion of the -ray data to other radiation types. The
historical approach examined the RBE of a set of rel-
evant biological end points in animal exposures for
radiations of dierent quality (denoted by the value
of LET) and dened a quality factor Q(LET) as a
conservative upper limit of the RBE for the relevant
end points. As the RBE values depended on lev-
els of exposure and dose rates, the maximum RBE
values were found to be exceedingly large (table II).
Again, such large RBE values are related to repair
rates and repair eciencies (ref. 28) and must be re-
ected in risk assessment methods. Some of the re-
pair aspects of uence-based risk coecients (ref. 29)
are discussed elsewhere (ref. 30) and may provide one
approach to this issue. A second approach would
be to couple cell response models with tissue system
models for evaluation of risk (ref. 28). The approach
in this paper was to examine the impact on future
NASA missions of using current estimated biological
uncertainty. It is clear that such uncertainties may
result in a large additional dollar cost to missions to
the Moon and Mars. Furthermore, the reduction of
these uncertainties and development of improved risk
models will have an important impact on mission op-
erations and would substantially reduce mission cost.
The cost of this biological research and model devel-
opment is small when compared with the projected
increase in mission cost because of the uncertainties
discussed herein.
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Figure 23. Required shield for walls and shelters to protect
astronauts from SEP for 18-month mission to Mars.
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Figure 24. Excess mission cost from added shielding for ve-
hicle and habitat to ensure astronaut safety for 18-month
Mars mission.
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Figure 25. Excess fatal cancer risk for astronauts exposed to
SEP in vehicles or habitats for 29-month Mars mission
nominal design.
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Figure 26. Required shield for walls and shelters to protect
astronauts from SEP for 29-month mission to Mars.
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Figure 27. Excess mission cost from added shielding for ve-
hicle and habitat to ensure astronaut safety for 29-month
Mars mission.
Concluding Remarks
The eect of risk uncertainties due to heavy-
ion galactic cosmic ray (GCR) exposure for rela-
tively short-duration lunar missions has been ana-
lyzed. The results indicate that shield design and
mission cost are signicantly aected by these un-
certainties. The analysis does not explicitly include
the eect of uncertainties in the properties of the
shielding materials (including uncertainties in radi-
ation transport), the dependence of risk coecients
on linear energy transfer (LET), the quadratic terms
in the dose response function, the dependence of risk
on dose rate, and other eects that may need to be
considered for special circumstances or longer dura-
tion missions. Shield requirements have been esti-
mated for simple congurations in a severe (but not
necessarily unreasonable) worst-case solar are en-
vironment. Because of the importance of the high-
energy spectrum of the February 1956 event, some
eort should be made to improve our knowledge of
this event. The results show that GCR risk uncer-
tainties can dramatically impact many lunar mission
parameters; therefore, such calculations need to be
incorporated into engineering design considerations
at an early stage. The methods were applied to a
60-day lunar mission and had a similar impact on
mission design for the 6-month mission. Further
analysis of 18-month and 29-month missions to Mars
also reveals a large impact on the missions, resulting
in tens of billions of dollars in excess mission cost
to ensure safe designs. Finally, the calculation pre-
sented herein oers a new approach to understand-
ing the cost-eectiveness of investment in radiation
physics and radiobiological research.
NASA Langley Research Center
Hampton, VA 23681-0001
May 6, 1993
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